How to reach agreement with even the most intractable opponent: Henry Kissinger's techniques

Henry Kissinger is a Nobel Peace Prize laureate and one of the most influential politicians of the 20th century. As a diplomat and international relations expert, he actively participated in negotiations with the USSR during the Cold War, forged relations between the United States and the PRC, and played an important role in ending the Vietnam War.

In the book “The Art of Negotiation According to Kissinger. Lessons in High-Level Deal Making, published in October by the Azbuka-Atticus Publishing Group, exploring the techniques and tactics used by Kissinger. Based on these, they offer practical advice on how to succeed in negotiations, teach you how to choose the right time to make concessions, and give advice on how to maintain a good reputation.

Relationship and understanding

Kissinger is most often perceived as a geopolitical grandmaster who moved pieces on the world chessboard in pursuit of American interests as he imagined them; therefore, it may be surprising to see the importance he attached to building personal relationships and goodwill in negotiations. Naturally, Kissinger placed national interests above personal or regional interests. However, national interests were far from everything.

Kissinger noted: "Very often there is a kind of gray zone where the national interest is not self-evident or controversial." In such situations, the obvious value of direct personal interaction with partners comes to the fore for Kissinger. Direct contact is often the key to everything, "[because] you can speak directly about what you really think about, about what cannot be communicated over the wire."

Building trust can (and does) pay off.

Kissinger stresses that it is important to develop and strengthen relations before the need for concrete negotiations arises. Indeed, while someone focused on relationships with individuals, Kissinger managed to create a large and varied network that was much wider than official channels and brought together journalists, press, television, cultural figures and academic theorists.

Agreeing with former Secretary of State George Schultz, who emphasized the importance of “tending a diplomatic garden” for relationships to flourish, Kissinger said, “It's very important to establish a relationship before you even need anything, because a degree of respect is important in a negotiation. when it comes to them or when a crisis occurs. When the Secretary of State goes somewhere … sometimes the best result is that you do not achieve results, but mutual understanding for the future, the next time you come to this country. " Constant personal contacts between managers help to agree on goals and "keep the collaboration machine in working order."

Such communication is sometimes more effective if it takes place in an informal setting, far from the public eye. It allows you to explore the full range of opportunities and prevent possible political and bureaucratic opponents from mobilizing and blocking initiatives. The benefits of stable personal contact are sometimes underestimated, but it can have a positive effect on the relations of heads of state. Trusting relationships allow partners to open up to each other, share useful information or observations. And a whole network of such relationships becomes even more valuable in complex negotiations.

Building rapport with opponents

When building relationships with a president or a negotiating partner, Kissinger could be very charming. Outbursts of his anger became legend, but his personal style (well-informed, witty, happy to share information and happy to tell funny stories, sometimes flatter his partners, more and more famous) was a big plus in the negotiations.

Working on the biography of Kissinger and describing his inherent charm, Walter Isaacson interviewed some of the journalists who met with the politician. One of them remarked:

"[Kissinger] tells you what he thinks you want to hear and then asks for your opinion, which is very flattering."

Isaacson expands on this thought: “Another tactic was intimacy. As if slightly imprudently, with complete confidence (besides, neither one nor the other was invented), Kissinger shared confidential information and inside information. “It always feels like he told you 10 percent more than he should,” said Barbara Walters. In the company or in such comments, about which he knew beforehand that they would not be made public, he could be surprisingly frank, especially when it came to people."

We already know from Winston Lord and Anatoly Dobrynin about the effectiveness of Kissinger's sense of humor, with the help of which he could improve the atmosphere of negotiations, and sometimes defuse it. Kissinger had enough humorous tricks and counter-tricks in his arsenal. During the 1972 Moscow summit, the Americans' photocopier broke down. “Keeping in mind that the KGB has a reputation for being Orwellian as ubiquitous,” Kissinger quipped, “during a meeting in the elegant Catherine Hall in the Kremlin, I asked Gromyko if he would make some copies for us if we held our documents up to the chandelier. Gromyko, without batting an eye, replied that the cameras had been installed here under the tsars; people can be photographed with them, but documents - alas”.

Empathic identification with negotiating opponents

We have seen more than once how consistently and profoundly Kissinger sought to understand the psychology and political context of his opponents. And this was not just a calm observation from the outside. Winston Lord, a participant in many negotiations with Kissinger, left the following comment: “Kissinger's interlocutors had the feeling that he understood their point of view, even if ideologically they were on opposite poles. Liberal or conservative - everyone felt that Kissinger at least understood him, and perhaps even sympathized with him."

Frank Shakespeare, the head of the US News Agency during the Nixon presidency, put it more bluntly: “Kissinger can meet six different people, damn smart, educated, knowledgeable, experienced, very different views, and convince all six that the real Henry Kissinger is the one who speaks to each of them now. " Kissinger was pejoratively called a "chameleon" who chooses his "words, actions, jokes, and style to please anyone he talks to." Talking about the situation with which they were dealing, he singled out one side for one side, and another for the other."

Of course, for all negotiations it is quite common, and often useful, to highlight different aspects of the situation for different partners with different interests and views.

Empathy, a deep understanding of the other side's views can improve communication, relationships, and negotiation progress.

Empathy is a tricky term. By using it, we are not talking about sympathy or emotional connection with another person. No, we are referring to the non-judgmental demonstration that the empathic person does understand their partner's views, although they do not necessarily agree with them. If you don't overdo it - and if you combine that with persistence, as we saw with Kissinger on a variety of occasions, from South Africa to the Soviet Union, you will be able to acquire a valuable negotiating skill. In this way, the parties can feel that they are being heard, gain a sense of connection that can move the process forward.

Genuine empathy or evasiveness?

Yet such volatility was risky. Kissinger's associates might have suspected that he was two-faced, especially if they noticed obvious inconsistencies. Shimon Peres, who was twice the prime minister of Israel, remarked in a private conversation with Yitzhak Rabin: "With all due respect to Kissinger, I must say that of all the people I know, he is the most evasive."

It is easy to lose confidence by making false or conflicting statements to different people. According to Winston Lord, Kissinger sought to mitigate this risk. The lord noted:

"Kissinger was very good at talking to different audiences, playing on different nuances … [But], comparing the texts of interviews and speeches, he could not be caught in contradictions with himself."

In his book, Walter Isaacson quoted Shimon Peres: "If you didn’t listen very much, you might have been deceived by what he said … But if you listened carefully, then he was not lying." Isaacson argued that Kissinger "tried very hard to avoid overt ambivalence and double-dealing," and quoted the former secretary of state: "I may have kept a lot of secrets … but that doesn't mean I was lying."

Many of Kissinger's partners speak positively of his negotiating manner. British Prime Minister James Callaghan disagreed with Kissinger in many ways, but even he argued: "His flexibility and quickness of mind in some circles gave him a reputation for being insincere, but I officially declare: in our joint affairs he never deceived me."

Anatoly Dobrynin admitted: “[Kissinger] thought in a business-like manner and did not like to resort to ambiguity or avoid any specific problems. When later we were in serious negotiations, I learned that he can drive you to white heat, but, to his credit, he was smart and highly professional."

While trying to understand those with whom he negotiated, Kissinger tended to establish a strong bond and relationship with them.

Charm, flattery, humor were used, but most importantly, he sought to identify himself with the other side, to show that he understands her interests and empathizes with her point of view.

This form of empathy can be an invaluable asset, but it can also yield mixed results, depending on what it pursues and how it is perceived. This is exactly the case when perception beats reality. Even if stubborn facts literally scream that there is no manipulation or deception, and the partner suspects something, the result may be caution and suspicion, rather than trust and good relations. Kissinger himself emphasized: “The same diplomats meet each other many times; but the ability to negotiate will be undermined if they earn a reputation for being evasive or double-dealing."

Suggestions, concessions and "constructive vagueness"

Kissinger emphasizes that it is important to understand the dynamics of the process in order not to be mistaken in the choice of tactics. Almost lyrically, he describes how the negotiator first deals with the vague and intangible, and how the contours of the situation gradually emerge: “Complex negotiations begin just like a conspiracy marriage. The partners understand that the formalities will soon be over, and that's when they really get to know each other. Neither side can initially say at what point the need will turn into consent; when an abstract desire for progress spills over into at least a faint understanding; what disagreement, by the very fact of overcoming it, will generate a feeling of unity, and what will lead to a dead end, after which the relationship will break off forever. The future, fortunately, is hidden from us, so the parties are trying to do what they would never dare, if they knew what lies ahead."

Kissinger strongly argues that before you take on the defense of your own views, interests or positions, you should know as much as possible about the situation.

We have already shown what can be learned with careful preparation. Kissinger recalled: “Almost always in the first round of new negotiations, I was engaged in self-education. At this stage, as a rule, I did not put forward proposals, but tried to grasp what was not expressed in words in the position of my partner, and, proceeding from this, to change both the volume and the limits of possible concessions."

Offers and concessions: how and when are they made?

Many believe that negotiations are just bargaining, almost like in a bazaar: one makes the initial, largest offer, while others accept (or do not accept). Concessions are made slowly, in the hope that the parties will eventually agree on a deal. At the beginning of his career, and then, reflecting on his experience, Kissinger both praised and criticized the stereotypical manner of bargaining: “When an agreement is between two starting points, it makes no sense to put forward moderate proposals. With good bargaining technique, the starting point is always much further than desired. The more over-the-top the initial offer, the more likely it is that what you really want will be achieved through a compromise.”

Building on that thought, he warned of the risk of over-demanding: “One tactic - very, very traditional - is to push for maximum demands right away and gradually retreat to something more achievable. This tactic is very popular with negotiators, passionately defending the reputation they have in their country. Yes, it may be tough to start negotiations with the most extreme requirements, but then you need to ease the tension and move away from the initial setting. If the opponent succumbs to the temptation to resist at every stage in order to understand what the next change will bring, then the whole negotiation process turns into a test of resilience."

Instead of tactical exaggeration, Kissinger recommends clearly explaining to the other side your goals, determined by certain interests.

He argues that without this, no effective negotiations will work.

Kissinger proposed general rules when to enter into negotiations, how to formulate initial provisions, when to make concessions: “The optimal moment for negotiations is when everything seems to be going well. To succumb to pressure is to click on it; gaining a reputation for short-lived power is to give the other side an excellent excuse to drag out the negotiations. A voluntary concession is the best way to induce reciprocity. And it also guarantees the preservation of strength best of all. In my negotiations, I have always tried to determine the most reasonable outcome and achieve it as soon as possible, in one or two moves. This strategy was ridiculed, called “preemptive concession” by lovers of negotiated “dribbling”, and even done at the last moment. But I believe that it is she who best calms the bureaucrats and calms the conscience, because it impresses newcomers as a show of strength.

Of course, there is a certain risk of failure here; salami tactics A negotiation technique in which information is released gradually and concessions are made in small chunks. - Approx. ed. prompts you to hold on, wonder what the next concession might be, without any confidence that the edge has already been reached. That is why in many negotiations - with Vietnam and other countries - I preferred to take big steps when they were least expected, when pressure was minimal, in order to create the impression that we will continue to adhere to this position. I was almost always against a forced change in our negotiating position."